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Defining Language
David L. Thompson
“Now we can also determine the difference between men and animals by these 
two means. For it is a very remarkable fact  that there are no men so dull-witted 
and stupid, not even madmen, that they are incapable of stringing together 
different words, and composing them into utterances, through which they let 
their thoughts be known; and, conversely, there is no other animal, no matter 
how perfect and well endowed by birth it may be, that can do anything similar.”  
(Descartes)1
1   Introduction: The Question
Descartes is right that language is a defining characteristic of 
humans. Without language, we could not have evolved into selves. Yet his 
simple dichotomy is hard to defend nowadays when, on the one hand, we have 
come to know of various pathologies of language that leave some humans with
serious linguistic deficits and, on the other hand, we have research attributing 
language to other animals (and maybe even to trees!) 
      In a recent article in Scientific American, Kenneally, for instance, points out:
The list of abilities that were formerly thought to be a unique part of 
human language is actually quite long. It includes parts of language, such
as words. Vervet monkeys use wordlike alarm calls to signal a specific 
kind of danger. Another crucial aspect is structure. Because we have 
syntax, we can produce an infinite number of novel sentences and 
meanings, and we can understand sentences that we have never heard 
before. Yet zebra finches have complicated structures in their songs, 
dolphins can understand differences in word order and even some 
monkeys in the wild seem to use one type of call to modify another. The 
list extends to types of cognition, such as theory of mind, which is the 
ability to infer others' mental states. Dolphins and chimpanzees are 
excellent at guessing what an interlocutor wants.2
Such findings make Descartes's simple dichotomy questionable. Remember 
that Descartes in 1637 had never seen a non-human primate!
Chamberlin claims that trackers do not simply see the tracks of animals; 
they "read" them and "interpret them" as representations of the animal which 
is absent. Should such reading be included in what we mean by "language?" 
And how about gestures, which some think are common to all humans, and 
maybe to chimps? Should they too be included under the rubric "language?"3
Against the backdrop of this continuum of similar activities from animals 
(and maybe plants) to humans, we need to figure out precisely what it is about 
language that makes it distinctively human. The position I defend in this paper 
is that language should be defined as a culturally normative mode of 
communication.
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2  Communication
Communication is a transfer of information, but not all transfers qualify 
as communication. Tides on the earth contain information about the moon; but 
the moon does not communicate with the tides. Light from one ancient galaxy 
will have reached some other galaxy billions of years ago, but while these 
photons carried information, I do not count such a purely accidental, causal 
transfers as communication . Perhaps we might label it a "signal." 
I will reserve the term "communication" for information transfers that are
"functional", that is, that are designed for the function of transferring 
information. Humans might place a sensor on the moon that is designed to 
communicate data about the moon, such as its temperature, to researchers on 
the earth. Such a sensor does not just incidentally transfer information; 
transferring information is what the sensor is for; that is, its function. 
Not all functions, however, require an intelligent designer. Biological 
evolution may, over generations, confer a function onto organic entities. A 
mammal's heart, for instance, not only actually pumps blood; its function is to 
pump blood. Whether a heart is actively engaged in pumping blood or is still, 
that is, not pumping, is irrelevant from the viewpoint of physics: physical laws 
explain the situation equally well in either case. From the viewpoint of biology, 
however, the state of not pumping is a case of heart failure: the heart has 
failed to fulfill the function for which it evolved over millions of years. A process
has a biological function in so far as its existence is due to its having conferred 
evolutionary fitness on the ancestors of the current organism. 
I want to use this biological sense of "function" to give a technical 
definition of "communication" and distinguish it from other, more general forms
of information transfer. "Communication" is any process that not only transfers 
information, but whose function it is to transfer information. This is a normative
point: a communication that fails to transfer information is a failure; it has not 
fulfilled its function.
Consider, for example, the claim by Suzanne Simard and her colleagues 
that they have discovered that some trees "really do communicate." When 
attacked by some pathogens, such a tree stimulates fungi that travel through 
the soil and get picked up by other trees in the vicinity. This gives the other 
trees advance warning of the pathogen and results in their immune system 
preparing a defence in advance of becoming infected. Is calling this 
communication simply a metaphoric mode of expression, a kind of 
anthropomorphic projection onto trees, or should we consider it "real" 
communication? As I am defining the term, this is an empirical issue: we have 
to investigate whether in fact the current existence of this mechanism of 
information transfer has evolved because it increased the fitness of ancestral 
trees. Since the indications from Simard are that this is indeed the case, then 
this transfer of information is indeed functional, and so the process qualifies as 
"communication" in the way I have defined it.4
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3 Language
"Language," as I propose to use the term, is one subspecies of 
communication, but I think it is unwise to use the term for all forms of 
communication. To do so, is to confuse phenomena that we should 
differentiate. (Simard, wisely, does not describe the communication of trees as 
language.) Calling all communication language obscures one of the most 
distinctive features of humans.
So what is it that differentiates language from other modes of 
communication? Let me outline two wrong answers to this question –
Chomsky's, Descartes'. Then I will offer the account that I think is correct. 
3.1  Syntax
3.1.1 Chomsky's Position
Noam Chomsky's holds that the essence of language is syntax. Since the 
1950s, Chomsky has sharply dichotomized semantics and syntax. Semantics is 
the meaning that an expression has. "The cat caught the mouse" and "the 
mouse was caught by the cat" are semantically identical -- they express the 
same meaning -- but their syntax, their grammatical structure, is different. 
"The dog chased the rat" and "The wolf caught the deer" have the same 
syntax, but carry different meanings, that is, they have different semantics. 
Semantics refers to meaning; syntax refers to the grammatical structure.
It is humans' syntactical capacity that allows us to speak and understand 
an infinity of expressions. Once we've grasped "The dog chased the cat" we 
can immediately understand "The wolf caught the deer" or "The elephant killed
the tiger" or any number of other substitutions, provided we know what 
elephants, tigers, deer, etc. are. Syntax is infinitely generative of new 
meanings.
Syntax also gives us recursion. We understand "The dog chased (the cat 
that caught the mouse (that ate the cheese.))” Animals cannot do this; they 
lack recursion. Indeed, they lack all syntax, according to Chomsky.
Since syntax is universal in all languages, and since it is impossible for 
children to obtain enough information to learn it -- the "poverty of the stimulus 
argument -- Chomsky claims that there is a Universal Grammar that is innate in
all human brains. As recently as 2014, he, and some of his followers, claim that
there is a genetic mutation that enables these features and which occurs only 
once in human evolutionary history. "According to the[ir] 'Strong Minimalist 
Thesis,' the key distinguishing feature of language (and what evolutionary 
theory must explain) is hierarchical syntactic structure. The faculty of language
is likely to have emerged quite recently in evolutionary terms, some 70,000–
100,000 years ago, and does not seem to have undergone modification since 
then."5
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3.1.2 Theoretical critique of Chomsky
Chomsky devised his theory at a time -- the 1950s and 60s --when the 
paradigm for computing was based largely on the manipulation of discrete 
symbols, and he modelled his conception of the brain's cognitive processes on 
this paradigm. The subsequent discovery of the learning capacities of 
distributed processing systems -- of neural networks -- cast some doubt on the 
appropriateness of discrete symbolic manipulation, that is, syntactical 
processing, as an adequate account of brain processing. In a further blow to 
the theory, current Artificial Intelligence speech recognition technology has 
advanced rapidly, but only after it dropped the rule-based, syntactic approach 
in favour of statistical probability correlations.6  Given these newer advances, 
the poverty of the stimulus argument is weakened: if AI programs can manage 
without innate syntax, it is possible that children's brains can too, so the 
assumption that language is universally supported by one, unique rule-
governed cognitive process is no longer theoretically necessary.
3.1.3 Empirical critique of Chomsky
Linguistic empirical studies challenging the universality of syntactical 
structures has also been accumulating. Evidence -- contested -- that the songs 
of some birds rely on syntactical structures, and the discovery that some 
monkeys communicate with cries that have inflectional endings suggest that 
syntax is not the exclusive privilege of human language.7 Other linguists claim 
to have found languages, most notably in the Amazon, that lack "essential" 
features such as recursion. Again the evidence is disputed. In addition, some 
studies of how children actually master language suggest that the poverty of 
the stimulus argument must be wrong. 
3.2  Semantics
Chomsky's focus on the syntactical aspect of language results in him 
neglecting semantics, about which he has less to say. But from my functional 
point of view, it is semantics that is the main function of language; the function
for which language evolved and continues to exist is to communicate meaning.
What, then, is linguistic meaning? How can we account for the semantics 
of language? I will first outline and reject an internalist approach, and then take
inspiration from Brandom for my own, externalist position.
A Cartesian, dualist approach accounts for the meaning of a linguistic 
utterance by appealing to an internal mental "idea," present to the individual's 
mind, that accompanies the utterance and is expressed by it. The meaning of 
language is derivative -- it is derived from the mind's intuition of an internal, 
primordial meaning-in-itself. The mind "grasps" an idea present before it, 
analogously to how the eye sees an object, and then secondarily attempts to 
express this internal idea externally in language in order to communicate it to 
others. Language itself, being merely physical, has no meaning; it is simply a 
passive instrument, a vehicle, to get meanings from one private interior to 
another. Meaning is like a mental ghost that gets carried along by intervening 
causal mechanisms, themselves meaningless.
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    This dualist approach has a problem. Since I have no access to your internal,
private ideas, how could I know what you mean by an expression? In Alice in 
Wonderland, Humpty-Dumpty says, "There's glory for you." 8 Alice can only find
out that by "glory" Humpty-Dumpty is expressing his idea "a knock-down 
argument" when Humpty-Dumpty tells her that's what he means. But how can 
he tell her unless she already knows what he means by "knock-down 
argument?" I cannot tell you what an expression means except by using other 
expressions that you already understand. So we are faced with a vicious 
regress: unless we know the meaning of words we cannot discover what words 
mean. 
Building on Wittgenstein's criticism of this private, internal, and 
mentalistic account of language, Brandom offers an externalist theory of 
meaning.9 A linguistic community holds its members responsible for the 
inferences of any utterance.10 If a speaker utters the sounds "It is raining," then
the community assumes she is committed to also asserting that the streets are
wet, to wearing a raincoat or carrying an umbrella, and so on and on. If instead,
she asserts that, since it is raining, there is a large grey mammal with a trunk 
in the street, then those around her may come to believe that by the sounds "It
is raining" the speaker is mistakenly expressing the meaning that is correctly 
expressed by "There is an elephant." "There is an elephant" has the inferences 
that there is a solid object, that it is an animal, a mammal, that it is grey and so
on. The different set of inferences is what gives "It is raining" a different 
meaning than "It is an elephant." What internal idea or image the speaker may 
have in her mind is not the point. Even if the speaker is thinking of an elephant 
when she says, "It's raining," her utterance means that it is raining. Unlike 
Humpty Dumpty, she does not have control of the meaning of her utterance; 
the linguistic community does. The meaning of an assertion is the set of 
inferences the speaker should be committed to according to the norms of the 
community's language.11
This account distinguishes norms from facts. The fact that a speaker has 
an idea of rain in her mind when she says, "There is an elephant" is irrelevant 
to the meaning of her linguistic expression. Even if as a matter of fact she had 
an idea of an elephant in her mind, it is not that idea that constitutes the 
meaning of her expression. Even if she utters the expression while pointing to 
an elephant that is in fact in front of her, it is not this fact that determines the 
meaning of her assertion. Meaning cannot be understood as a factual matter, 
as the association or co-presence of mental objects and physical sounds. 
Meaning is a normative phenomenon.
The community sets the norms for what an assertion should mean and it 
"enforces" its norms by treating violators as unintelligible. Meaning is not an 
individual matter, but a communal norm. Someone who says it is raining but 
doesn't accept there is water falling from the sky, or who speaks of rain as a 
mammal, is excluding herself from the linguistic community. She is talking 
gibberish, cannot be relied upon for further information and will have to be 
excluded from any social project coordinated by language.12 
Brandom's externalism offers an alternative theory of the nature of 
linguistic meaning, one not based on the internal presence of an idea to a 
subject. It is not that the community holds speakers committed to certain 
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inferences because of the meaning that words already have; it is the inferences
that the community holds one committed to that constitute the meaning of the 
words in the first place. Linguistic meaning -- semantics -- is not based on facts 
about individual minds: it is constituted by communal norms. 
3.2.1 Normative Communication
My own position, building on Brandom's externalist account of meaning, 
is that language is that subspecies of communication that is based on cultural 
norms. Recall that I have defined communication as functional transfer of 
information. Non-linguistic communication is governed by biological norms. The
lion's roar has a meaning, a warning to others to stay away, but the meaning is
genetically based. As a biological function, of course, it could go wrong. If the 
lion has rabies, it might roar at a tree -- which is not what it should do. Its 
behaviour is dysfunctional. The norm the rabid lion has violated, however, is a 
biological one. What distinguishes language from other modes of 
communication, I am proposing, is that it is governed by cultural, not biological,
norms. It is a cultural norm that "It is raining" means that the streets are wet, I 
should take an umbrella, and all the other inferences others will hold me to. 
Using "There is an elephant" to mean "It is raining" violates the norms of 
English; it is dysfunctional, but not in the biological sense. The correct use, the 
meaningful use, of an expression is constituted by each specific linguistic 
community. In my account of language, sounds are linguistically meaningful in 
so far as they are governed by the norms laid down by a particular cultural 
tradition and that have been learned by speakers and listeners within that 
community. 
Vocal chords are not the only bodily activity that can be governed by 
cultural communicative norms. Gestures can also convey meaning. While the 
focus of this paper is on verbal language, the definition of language I am 
proposing is wide enough to include non-verbal language. Human bodily 
behaviour is based on biology, but it is significantly patterned by culture.  
Indeed, it is possible that human language originated in gesture. Contemporary
sign languages clearly qualify as “language.” Even without the structures of a 
recognized sign language, informal “body language” should not be taken as a 
metaphor: even posture communicates meaning. Some bodily behaviours 
express purely biological meanings, but behaviours that are governed by the 
norms of a group’s tradition qualify as “language.” 
3.2.2  Evolution
But how does such a tradition come about?
Such traditions are set up by evolution. If the mechanism of evolution is 
"the survival of the fittest" (a limited view as we will see) then we should ask 
what features made hominins fit. While there have been many proposals, 
recent discussion has focused on cooperation. Early humans, perhaps as early 
as two million years ago, formed groups that could fend off predators, hunt 
large animals, and use team-work for gathering. Humans in such groups were 
better at these tasks than individuals living alone. That is, cooperation 
conferred comparative fitness.
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Simple cooperative tasks could be coordinated by emotional contagion. 
When some chimps get restless and feel like hunting, others do too and soon a 
party sets off together. Imitation may lead one individual to copy the use of a 
stick as a tool. But more complicated tasks, such as hunting large mammals, 
require more complex communication. Cooperation in a group of, say, 100 
would need some standardized gestures or sounds to assign roles, indicate 
where the prey is, who is to lead, and so on. Such techniques of communication
would be common to all members of the group and could be passed on to 
younger members. In this way a local tradition would be established within the 
group. Groups that come up with such techniques would do better than others 
in the competition between groups for resources. It is the set of such group-
defined ways of communicating that I am calling a "language."
Language in this sense is a crucial tool in the hominin evolutionary 
strategy of cooperation within the group. But language does not only enhance 
cooperation; it is, as Tomasello points out, itself a cooperative enterprise.13 The
speaker does whatever she can to encourage the hearer's correct 
interpretation of the speaker's utterance. The hearer, in turn, takes the 
speaker's sounds or gestures to be carrying information of value, and in 
interpreting them, assumes that the speaker is trying to pass on information 
valuable to the hearer. Such communication is likely to be more effective if 
both speaker and hearer follow common norms for the exchange, that is, if 
they speak the same language.
3.2.3  Meaning without syntax
Since the evidence is that the human strategy of cooperative groups is at
least a million years old, perhaps even two million, some form of 
communication based on communal norms likely existed from this very early 
period. Syntax may well be a recent evolutionary development, as Chomsky 
maintains. My claim is that, even if this is true, language -- in the way I am 
defining it as communication governed by cultural norms -- has been around 
for much longer. It could transmit meaning, that is, it would have semantics, 
but, contrary to Chomsky, it should be described as a non-syntactical language.
What could that look like?
In a non-syntactical language, each different expression would have to be
governed by its own norms, more or less independently of the norms of other 
expressions. Individuals would have to learn what commitments each particular
expression involved. Knowing the meaning of one piece of language would be 
no help in figuring out the meaning of any other. Such a language would not be
parsable. This may be the case in learned animal communication. Dogs, for 
example, must be trained separately for each specific command. Even if a dog 
responds correctly to "Your bone is in the garden" and also obeys the 
command "Bring me my slippers," it may be unable to respond to "Bring me 
your bone." That is, it doesn't grasp the syntactical structure, "Bring me xxxx," 
in which various nouns can be substituted for xxxx. Similarly, an early hominin 
without syntax might learn how to respond correctly to the sounds, "Bring-me-
my-spear," but would have to learn from scratch what to do with the sounds, 
"Bring-me-my-axe." Mastering one would not help in mastering the other. Yet 
David L. Thompson                       Defining Language                                                             8
each sequence of sounds could have a meaning within the cultural tradition. 
That is, language can have semantics, even if it has no syntax.
Because, in its advanced stages, human language is syntactical, it is 
tempting to suppose that there was syntax from the origin and to make it an 
essential, defining feature of language, as Chomsky does. My claim is that, 
important as syntax is to current language, it is anachronistic to project it back 
into early language. That later linguistic communities can set up, as one of 
their norms, that language should follow syntactical rules -- and due to its 
superior efficiency, most if not all languages have eventually done so -- should 
not overshadow the essential feature of human language: its power to 
constitute and convey meaning, that is, its semantics.
Syntax has many advantages. Nevertheless, evolving the cognitive 
capacities to master syntax is costly. Nowak presents a mathematical model to
argue that once the number of speakers and number of objects to be spoken 
about exceed certain thresholds, the fitness of syntactic language outweighs 
that of non-syntactical language and so it has a selective advantage. If he is 
right, then the Chomskian insistence that syntax is the essence of language 
can be replaced by a simple pragmatic approach: at some point in hominin 
evolution, communities whose language came to rely on syntax gained a 
fitness advantage. This probably happened slowly, in a gradual, stepwise 
process, like most evolutionary changes. We don't have to think of syntax as a 
giant step, as if it were an all or nothing phenomenon explainable by a sudden,
single, chance genetic mutation. That some monkeys add inflections to their 
calls, or that some song birds recognize some syntactical errors, does not imply
that they have full access to recursion or infinite substitutability.14 15
3.2.4  Evolution of syntax
Mutations alone cannot drive evolution. A mutation contributes to evolution only
if there is selective pressure to preserve it. Three million years ago, if an individual 
had undergone a mutation that enabled syntax in a context in which human 
cooperation was not yet significant, there would have been little selective pressure for 
its replication, so it would likely have died out. Only when the hominin lifeway had 
already become cooperative and already relied on culturally normative communication
-- what I am labelling "language" -- would mutations for syntax have a selective 
advantage. It is not syntax that explains the evolution of language; language must 
already have existed for syntax to evolve.
Arbitrarily defining language as syntax, as Chomsky does, obscures this 
relationship. Not surprisingly, therefore, Chomsky downplays communication. He says,
"Externalized language may be used for communication, but that particular function is
largely irrelevant in this context. Thus, the origin of the language faculty does not 
generally seem to be informed by considerations of the evolution of communication."16
I think this position is mistaken. Conceding that "externalized" language can be used 
for communication misses the point that linguistic meaning is external from the get-
go. Language does not originate in the mind or the in the brain's cognitive abilities and
secondarily get externalized. The primary function of language, that for which it has 
evolved, is the communication of meaning which occurs in the external, communal 
environment. It is communication that defines language. Cognitive changes in the 
brain, such as syntactical abilities, facilitate language, but communication is what 
defines it.
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4   Conclusion
Language defines human existence. Yet defining language is a fraught project. I 
use the term "language" to refer to a specific mode of information transfer. First, it is a
communicative mode. By communication I mean the information transfer serves a 
function, that is, an activity that occurs because it has increased the evolutionary 
fitness of ancestors. Secondly, while all communication is governed by norms, human 
communication, as opposed to biological communication, is governed by norms that 
have evolved within the learned traditions of individual cultures. The meaning of an 
assertion in a culture’s language is the set of commitments to which that culture holds
its speakers when they utter that assertion. Syntax has appeared in recent evolution 
to facilitate and enrich the communicative function, but it is a secondary aspect of 
language. The defining characteristic of human communication, of "language," -- is its 
capacity to constitute meaning. 
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